

through his archival research, flushed the Protestant ideologues from their lazy and comfortable assumptions, with the reluctant recognition that ‘the majority of the English people in the sixteenth century would have preferred to remain Catholic, and that the Reformation was in fact imposed on the nation by Henry VIII and his daughter Elizabeth.’ (p. 148) A key but tragic figure is James Anthony Froude, who began as a devout disciple of Newman but then fell away from the ‘hothouse churchiness’ of the Tractarians and embraced a low-church religion of moral goodness. His dilemma was that he knew enough history to make his readers discover that the Reformation’s attempt to justify the colossal suffering and injustice it caused was based on lies, but he could not see his way back, so that, in Hegelian fashion, the Reformation could only be justified as an unfortunate but necessary step to achieve England’s true maturity in the British Empire. As the latter is now in eclipse, it might be time to re-evaluate the former. As for the savage and venal means used to attain the blessed goal, there was little good to be said. He wrote: ‘Elsewhere, worldliness was the tool of zeal. Here, zeal was the tool of worldliness. A King, whose character may best be described by saying that he was despotism itself personified, unprincipled ministers, a rapacious aristocracy, a servile Parliament, such were the instruments by which England was delivered from the yoke of Rome.’ (quoted p. 145) Indeed, Froude found it more and more difficult to say that the Reformation was better than what it

replaced: ‘To the Universities the Reformation has brought with it desolation. To the people of England it had brought with it widespread misery and want. The once open hand was closed; the once open heart was hardened; the ancient loyalty of man to man was exchanged for the scuffling of selfishness; the change of faith had brought with it no increase of freedom, and less of charity. The prisons were crowded as before with sufferers for opinion, and the creed of a thousand years was made a crime by a doctrine of yesterday.’ (quoted p. 152) Allegedly, things had to get worse before they got better; unfortunately, they only got worse.

Duffy reviews even-handedly the attempted Catholic-Lutheran reconciliation on the figure of Luther, coming down slightly in favour of Ratzinger’s and Richard Rex’s view of a possible compatibility on the doctrines on justification, while insisting on a serious psychological disturbance in Luther’s ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ personality, which most scholars concede. Duffy gives space to the Indologist (and Catholic convert) Paul Hacker who criticizes Luther for his ‘reflexive faith’, which ‘bends back upon its own subject in its very act.’ Such hyper-individualism is surprisingly close to the Lutheran definition of sin (following Augustine) as ‘*incurvatus in se*’. Thus Luther’s personality becomes exhibit A in his own prosecution of the Catholic Church! This looks suspiciously like being ‘hoisted on one’s own petard’.

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Coping With Defeat: Sunni Islam, Roman Catholicism, and The Modern State. By Jonathan Laurence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021. Pp. xxvi, 578. £28.00/\$35.00.

This book contains a list of 113 illustrations, 27 tables, and abbreviations of key phrases. The introduction provides a panoramic view of the entire book, followed by ten chapters, including a conclusion, regime timelines from 1500 to the present, maps, a glossary of foreign and important terms, interviews, profuse notes, a helpful bibliography, and an index. Laurence argues that three defeats or shocks gradually consumed the political ties between the last major Christian empire (the Papal States) and the Ottoman Empire. This shock came at a different time for Roman Catholics and Sunni Muslims, but had the effect of gradually binding religious authorities to the rule of law. This book has three critical parts: (1) The End of Empire, (2) The Nation-State Era and (3) The Era of Believers without Borders. Each particular historical shock or defeat moved religious authorities (such as the sultan or the pope) further along the scale of state-religion relations. To preserve the uniformity of rites in territory they did not control

physically, religious authorities had to surrender to state supremacy or civilian rule. Laurence notes that the growth or spread of Christianity and Islam in the first centuries of their existence were marked by aggressive expansion and subjugation to Christian or Muslim religious and political authorities.

Part I deals with the First Defeat and the Counterpunch. Laurence gives us a history of Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam at the time when the religious and political authorities were in the hands of one person, the pope in Rome and the caliph in Istanbul. For Roman Catholics the first shock in the modern era occurred with the Protestant Reformation. In the case of Sunni Islam, there was the downfall of the Ottoman Empire which lost its territory, dealt with sectarian competition, and witnessed the rise of European territorial expansion. With the Protestant Reformation, Rome went from 64 million followers spread out over 42 million square kilometres to 45 million followers on 21 million kilometres of land.

Mutatis mutandis, the Ottoman Empire had a similar fate. Though the Ottoman Empire at its acme had thirty million subjects on 45 million square kilometres in 1862, it only had thirteen million subjects on 780,000 square kilometres of land in 1922.

How did the Roman Catholic Church respond to the Protestant Reformation? Pope Paul III (1468–1549) played an important role in countering the Reformation by convening the Council of Trent (1545–1563). Trent required that every diocese have a seminary to train priests to be professionals. It commissioned the Jesuit order to educate students in elite high schools and colleges. It also came out with a written catechism to educate the laity about church doctrine and morality. Moreover, the Church instituted a Vatican congregation known as the *Propaganda Fide* in 1622 with the charge of overseeing the faith in missionary countries worldwide. Later on in the 1860s, Pope Pius IX lost his temporal power, used his fiat to depose monarchs, and forbade the laity from voting in democratic elections. From now on, the popes would only possess spiritual and moral power.

How did the Ottoman Empire under the caliphs respond to defeat? The sultans no longer were in charge of the military and political project. Abdülmecid (1839–1861) and Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) were the most important caliphs for State-Islam because they were progressive in their decision-making. They guarded the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, allowed religious tolerance for the ‘people of the book,’ set up a religious educational system, turned the *ulema* (Muslim scholars who knew Islamic law and theology) into professionals, and chartered *qadis* (judges of a Shari’a court), *naibs* (members of parliament in Arab countries), and *mufitis* (legal experts who ruled on matters of religion). The caliphs established mosques, Quranic schools, and increased the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire from 2.5 to 6.3 million subjects in the nineteenth century. The caliphs persuaded sheiks and preachers to serve as missionaries in the U.K., the Balkans, and Cape Town, as well as in north Africa, the Levant, and Indonesia. More significantly, with the military and political strength of the European countries, the unravelling of the relationship between the Ottoman caliph and the colonial empire of the Great Powers in Europe occurred from the 1880s to the 1920s. In 1914, Ottoman sultan, Mehmed V declared war on the nation-states to no avail. Using diplomatic channels, the Ottoman caliph persuaded the French and British troops to avoid invading the palace of the reigning caliph who had no temporal power, but only spiritual power. To this day, there would be no monarch or leader who could claim to

be head of the *umma* or global Muslim community, though several have tried to do so.

Part II looks at the rise of the nation-state when fifty percent of Rome and three quarters of the Ottoman Empire were nationalized. From 1790 to 1929, Rome suffered under political subordination in France, Italy, and Spain. Independent governments in north Africa and Turkey experienced a secular monopoly over general education and the state insisted on the loyalty of the clergy. Nation-states could not ban Islam and Catholicism completely because many believers of both faiths thought highly of the rites, liturgy, and practices of their respective religions.

Part III comments on the third defeat, and bears the title, ‘Believers without Borders’. It deals with Catholicism in the US, Islam in Europe, and the differences between nation-state Islam as opposed to the Islamic State. Thanks to immigration from Europe, the Catholic population went from 100,000 (or one percent of the population in the US) to 75 million or 23 percent of the population in 2020. Correspondingly, the population of Muslims in Europe went from several hundreds of thousands in 1965 to twenty million in 2015. Chapter eight focuses on Islam in Europe. The European countries desired to have an ‘easy-care Islam’ that would not please Muslims, who in turn responded stating that ‘Islam is Islam.’ Islamic religious authorities in Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, and so on, wanted to preserve ties with their followers in European countries. They felt that the better acquainted people are with their cultural roots, the more immunized they would be from joining a transnational Islamic movement like ISIS. For their part, European governments rejected the funding of Islam between 2015 and 2020. Yet in 2020, a state-funded Islamic college opened in Osnabrück, Germany to train imams. In 2021, modern Muslim states have an extraterritorial piece comprising millions of European Union citizens abroad. In sum, this brought about the passage of Europe’s status from *dar al harb* (lands not bound by Islamic law or Shari’a) to *dar al Islam* (lands bound by Islamic law).

In writing this book, Laurence has spent many years doing fieldwork and archival research around the globe. He has synthesized hundreds of books and scholarly articles. In sum, this volume is profound, ground-breaking and erudite. It is the best gift a researcher can bequeath to the scholarly world. Finally, Princeton University Press should be commended for publishing this immense volume at a very fair price.

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