Managing transnational Islam: Muslims and the state in Western Europe

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Introduction

Contemporary scholarly accounts of Islam in Europe have tended to portray one of two extreme visions: heaven on earth or hell in a hand basket. In the pessimistic version, foreign policy analyses and the scholarly literature are in rare concurrence about the meager chances for either inter-religious dialog or Muslim integration. These accounts bear witness to a showdown between intransigently secular states and an ambitious, fundamentalist religion whose followers aim to transform the continent into “Eurabia” (Ye’or 2005; Ferguson 2004; Savage 2004). To justify their gloom, these authors cite Islam’s un-hierarchical nature and the impossibility of establishing legitimate representatives – or “one phone number” – for Muslim communities in Europe (Rémond 1999; Warner and Wenner 2002). Compounding this difficulty, these scholars emphasize, is the inadequacy of Europe’s nineteenth-century state-church institutions, which stumble from crisis to crisis with this new and agile religious challenger (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Shore 2004). The optimistic voices, on the other hand, come from the camps of post-nationalist theorists and from proponents of a reformed “Euro-Islam” that is divorced from overseers and financiers in the Muslim world (Soysal 1994). But those authors’ cheerfulness is founded, respectively, on two formidable hypotheses: the diminishing importance of “host” state institutions for immigrant integration; and the “sending” states’ renunciation of religious influence over the Muslim Diaspora (AlSayyad and Castells 2002). A decade after they were first expounded, neither of these scenarios is in view.

Surprisingly, few studies (and virtually none in English) systematically compare how different national interior ministries have used

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political and institutional processes to organize Islam for state-religion relations (Dassetto et al. 2001). This chapter aims to sidestep the warring bands of pessimists and optimists, and instead sketches the character of State-Islam interaction in the first thirty years (1974–2004) of government consultations with foreign and native-born Muslim representatives in Europe. Based on thirty months of fieldwork and more than 150 interviews with religious leaders and policymakers in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, I argue that European nation-states have reasserted their sovereign prerogative to manage the transnational threats associated with their citizens’ religious membership (Grillo 2004). My research examines the theoretical and practical significance of the contemporary efforts to nationalize Muslim religious communities: these are political and institutional processes whose goal is to provide a more amenable context for the socio-political integration of all Muslims, religious or not. Three decades of increasingly assertive policies towards organized Islam in Europe militate against the image of states being overrun by the unplanned or undesired mass settlement of Muslims. This finding is in line with Krasner’s contrarian view that “globalization and state activity have moved in tandem”, and that this occurs across institutional models that might be expected to have dramatically distinct policy outcomes (1999: 223). A portrait emerges of the contemporary European nation-state not as a “weathervane” or a neutral broker among competing interests, but rather as an actor in its own right that structures nature of group-state relations in crucial ways (Bentley 1949; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985).

The challenge of integration

There is no shortage of “bad news” to support the pessimists. A sense of foreboding and an atmosphere of failed integration and social conflict hang like a cloud over the fifteen million or so Muslims living in Western Europe. As the preceding chapters have documented in part, second and third-generation immigrants suffer disproportionately high unemployment, widespread social discrimination, and feeble political representation in local and national institutions. This is coupled with the impression of imported threats from abroad, taking the form of cultural clashes over headscarves worn by schoolgirls or civil servants, or imams preaching hatred or violence, or violence and vandalism targeting the Jewish community. At best, most observers see a grave crisis of previous models of immigrant integration (Gresh and Ramadan 2000). At worst, they see evidence of a “reverse colonization” that will lead to the “Islamicization” of Europe (Caldwell 2004). Gilles Kepel, an authority on the Muslim
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world, has commented that Europe now faces a grave choice: “either we train our Muslims to become global citizens, who live in a democratic, pluralist society, or on the contrary, the Islamists win, and take over those Muslim European constituencies. Then we’re in serious trouble” (Wright 2004).

To use an analogy from the first era of modern state building, how do today’s governments attempt to make Frenchmen, Germans, or Italians out of Muslims – as authors have described the state-building process of turning “peasants into Frenchmen,” “juifs” into “Israelites,” or Christians into “good citizens” (Weber 1976)? There are different kinds of integration – socio-economic indicators tell one story, for example – but political integration is the underlying impulse of this historical process. To discover the true nature of European governments’ strategies towards organized Islam begs a look beyond the repressive measures that states can (and do) take, such as deporting extremist prayer leaders or arresting individuals who threaten public order. Instead, what are the constructive steps that make up the path to citizenship and a measure of integration for this new minority? In twentieth-century Western Europe, three arenas assured the gradual political integration of immigrants and new citizens from southern and eastern Europe: traditional participation through elections and civil society associations; civic inculcation through the national education system; and identification with the nation-state through service in the armed forces (Noiriel 1988). But today, party systems have largely failed to transmit social diversity into parliaments, public schools are in budgetary crisis and mandatory conscription is a thing of the (recent) past. How have national governments granted some degree of representation to these sizeable minority populations when traditional civic institutions failed to do so? The answer lies in the unexpected revival of a fourth arena: religious community. In an era of advanced secularization in Western Europe, ironically, governments there have fallen back on religion policy – via national state-church institutions – as a central tool of immigrant integration.

The attempts to nationalize Muslim organizations

The most striking evidence of this development is a Europe-wide move towards “nationalization” of Islam through the development of national consultations with Muslim civil society. The thousands of mosques, prayer rooms and religious associations that have popped up in the last few decades are nearly all under de jure or de facto foreign influence – as is characteristic of major world religions. The local and national Islam Councils that have emerged to streamline these prayer rooms – of greater
or lesser efficacy, from the French Council for the Muslim Religion, the Spanish Islamic Commission, the Belgian Muslim Executive, the Italian Consultation, to the Bavarian Islamic Community, etc. – are the culmination of a fifteen-year push by Muslims and public authorities alike for the legal recognition of Islam and the protection of freedom of worship on par with other major religions.

European interior ministries do not presume the existence of some essential “Muslim” to be trained into a mythical “citizen”. But regardless of Muslims’ diversity of national origin, piety and religious affiliation, policymakers have nonetheless come to see “their” Muslims as a community, a collectivity, and the object of public policymaking. These administrations are not engaged in the special accommodation of Muslims; they are incorporating Islam into pre-existing institutional state-church relations. It is in this domain that European governments are trying to create the institutional conditions for the emergence of an Italian or German Islam, e.g., rather than just tolerating Islam “in” Italy or Germany. The religion bureaus of European interior ministries structure and mediate the activities of religious organizations. As Baker writes in reference to another part of the world, such efforts aim to “ensure that the centrifugal push of religious loyalties that transnational religious regimes foster […] does not overcome the centripetal pull toward national unity that the state must nurture” (Baker 1997). The institutionalized relations between state and religion are predicated on the prioritization of national laws over religious texts, and aspire to steep religious leaders in the secular precepts of a society in which church and state are separate. In practical terms, national interior ministries accomplish these lofty goals by overseeing and helping coordinate the financing and construction of mosques, the training of imams, the appointment of Muslim chaplains in prisons and hospitals, the setting of religious curriculum in publicly-funded schools, and the celebration of major holidays and religious events – from orderly lamb slaughter for Eid al-Adha, to the orderly departure on pilgrimage to Mecca. This guarantees equal access to religious exercise at the same time that it favors the transparency of community ties with foreign governments and international NGOs (non-governmental organizations).

The state’s challenge has been to establish these nascent councils as legitimate interlocutors for public authorities. It is important to note that these are not “Muslim” councils as broad connections to these communities, any more than the French bishops’ conference can claim to represent Catholics on non-religious matters or Jewish central councils or grand rabbis can speak for all Jews. Nor does this stem from a desire to impose a Catholic-style hierarchy on Islam: after all, Protestants and Jews
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doj not naturally gravitate towards centralized representation, either, but they were required to reorganize to obtain full legal recognition. The creation of Islam Councils reflects governments’ desire to mold Islam into an organizationally homologous shape, as the modern secular state has asked of all major religions and cults. Governments behave with Islam as they have with previous transnational religious challenges: they seek to weaken ties abroad and strengthen institutional connections at home, in the hope of enhancing the authority of the nation-state over competing demands on citizens’ socio-political loyalties. Religious belonging has persistently posed challenges to the meaning of territory and citizenship by setting constitutions in competition with a higher law. Rosenblum calls this the “painful conflict between the obligations of citizenship and the demands of faith.” This is remarkably similar to Locke’s concerns over the suitability of Christians as republican citizens, as well as the enlightenment-era logic of Mirabeau or Von Dohm, who argued that emancipated and domestically-oriented Jews would make for more useful members of society as full citizens (Parekh 2000; Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz 1995). In McConnell’s apt paraphrasing of Rousseau: “your citizenship can be in Heaven or in France, but not in both” (2000: 92). Faced with a dual system, priest and prince, Rousseau doubted that believers could be trusted which to choose: “The sacred cult of Christianity aimed to become independent of the sovereign, and had no natural or necessary bond with the body of the state [. . .] Far from attaching citizens’ hearts to the State, it detaches them from it as from all worldly things” (Rousseau, Masters, and Masters 1978: 126). Following the liberal democratic revolutions of eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe, the consolidating nation-states often tried to weaken – and domesticate – the powerful transnational Catholic network: new state-church frameworks eliminated the Church’s monopolistic or dominant position, the clergy was subjected to a civil code, and church property and wealth was taxed or seized. The development of national institutions to regulate religious life sought to reduce the risks of radical anti-state influences and, indirectly, to make better citizens of church faithful.

The results of my empirical research suggest that the same kind of effort is the major background to Muslim integration in Europe today. Rather than reflecting the post-national dynamics that some scholars claim to observe, the most significant measures of Muslim accommodation have occurred in reaction to organized Islam’s challenge to the authority of modern, secular states. What emerges as the major plot-line of this story are European states’ parallel efforts to confront the transnational nature of Muslim organizations operating under their national public law. These attempts to assert authority over transnational Islam look very similar
to earlier moves to create centralized interlocutors for religious affairs. Public recognition has provided a toolkit to modify or sever transnational ties; as Markell writes about the 1812 Prussian Emancipation legislation, the recognition of difference can be seen as “an instrument of, rather than a threat to, [state] sovereignty” (Markell 2003: 31). Markell views institutionalization as a “double bind” – a tradeoff at the highest theoretical level of state building: “[Emancipation] was not conceived merely as the fulfillment of liberal principles of fairness or equality, nor was it simply the gift of an indifferent king who expected nothing in return. It secured recognition for the Jews, yet it also secured recognition for Prussia by placing Jews into a new relationship with the state” (Markell 2003: 141).

Charting attempts at nationalization

Scholarly attempts to explain and typologize these governmental actions have not closely examined the links between national state-church organization and the Muslim world’s state-led and civil society networks that make up global Islam. Instead, they have focused on points of conflict and coercion. The existing literature offers little guidance to understand these governments’ efforts to grapple with the new social and political reality. Given my emphasis of the nation-state’s enduring importance to the integration of Islam in Europe, surprisingly little of my account flows from the particular national arrangements for the organization of religion. Instead, we are witnessing a broad, uncoordinated effort of institution building. I argue against three prevailing (and competing) misconceptions in the literature on the state accommodation of Islam in the West: the determinism of political opportunity structures; the impossibility of reconciling Islam and democracy; and the relevance of post-national dynamics.

First, one tendency has been to characterize European nation-states’ policy response as falling into national models in a predictable fashion. This school of thought holds that the best predictor of Islam’s integration is national institutional or ideational trajectories (Minkenberg 2003; Maréchal 2001). These authors argue that policies can be explained according to resource mobilization and opportunity structures: Cesari (1994), for example, writes that “different institutional arrangements tend to shape the agendas of Islamic mobilization and claims in different countries”. Fetzer and Soper (2005) suggest that conflict over the headscarf and school curriculum in France is merely the product of that country’s “long and contentious state-church history”; similarly, they find that “inherited state-church institutions best explain how Germany has accommodated Muslims” (2005: 94, 126). Using a similar logic, Long
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and Zolberg conclude that any status improvements for Islam in Europe follow a routine trajectory of pluralist minority incorporation in different national settings.

Second, other authors have advanced the notion that Islam is doctrinally unsuited for state-church separation in contemporary western democracies and take the pessimistic view that Islam may simply be incompatible with Western principles (Rémond 1999; Sartori 2000). They argue it is impossible to politically integrate Islam within secular Western nation-states, and point to the novelty of the challenges posed by Islamic doctrine: notably, the reluctance to accept basic liberal precepts that distinguish spiritual rule from temporal authority (Modood 1998). In this view, Muslim leaders’ refusal to allow Islam to be relegated to the private sphere is compounded by their systemic incapacity to produce centralized representatives for the government to address – that is, a single organization that can “communicate and negotiate” on behalf of Muslims (Rémond 1999; Laurence 2001). “In contrast to Catholicism,” Warner and Wenner write, “the Islamic religion is not conducive to large-scale collective action [. . . It is] decentralized, non-hierarchical religions with multiple, competing schools [. . . and has] no central authority to enforce cooperation or structure activity” (2002: 5–6). Thus, any state concessions to recognize Islam or to create “multicultural” policies benefiting Muslims’ religious identity are seen to weaken the foundations of liberal democracy because of Islam’s tendency to fuse religion and politics (Sartori 2000). This perspective predicts that governments will be hostile to demands made by Muslim communities and will avoid integrating Islam. Muslims, in turn, will be unable to take advantage of opportunities presented to them because of internal disunity. These authors predict continuous conflict between Islam and the state and a reluctance to make religious accommodations.

Third is the argument that transnational forces are overcoming old national institutions, and that accommodation of Islam would occur only over the dead body of the nation-state. Soysal’s 1994 study of the incorporation of guestworkers into West European social systems in the late 1980s and early 1990s – why states “extended rights and privileges of their citizens to migrant workers” – led to her theory of “post-national” rights acquisition. She opposed this development to Hammar’s conception of “denizenship,” (1990) which focuses on the changes in citizenship on a territorial, nation-state basis – which Soysal called the “mere expansion of the scope of national citizenship”; instead, she claimed, the state is “no longer an autonomous and independent organization closed over a nationally defined population” (1994: 139, 169). Thus, immigrants turn to international actors and acquire rights only thanks to the
increasing irrelevance of national citizenship regimes. The erosion of national institutions’ pertinence occurs by way of “constitutionally interconnected states with a multiplicity of memberships,” e.g., state membership in supranational organizations like the European Union and ECJ (European Court of Justice), or by way of international human rights norms established via the Universal Declaration and European Convention on human rights. According to this view, the integration of Islam takes place when national governments lose power and institutions associated with post-national processes gain authority.

But Soysal’s framework ignores the cultural conflict and demands for religious accommodation that cause controversy at local and national levels. Her theory does not adequately address how states manage the nitty-gritty of family law and state-church laws in religiously plural societies, domains that are still solidly under the competence of national governments. Her evocation of new post-national rights “to express and develop their cultural heritage” avoids the sticky question of the applicability of fatwas across borders, the propriety of wearing a headscarf in public institutions, the civil recognition of religious marriage and divorce, the obligation to wage holy war, the source of financing for prayer space and the training of imams, etc. These are all transnational challenges, but the basis for policy responses to them cannot be found in international institutions or human rights norms. After all, the ECHR (European Courts of Human Rights) respects national states’ rights to legislate the details of religious expression if public order is deemed to be threatened: the court upheld Turkish headscarf bans in public universities and its precedent was cited by French officials who drafted a law on religious symbols in public schools. Similarly, the French government felt secure enough to promote the 2005 Treaty for a European Constitution, even though the document included a clause on freedom of religious expression “in private and in public.”

My view is that states have not treated Islam as doctrinally impossible to integrate, and that they also regularly “jump” the purported categories of inherited institutional patterns. This goes against Soysal’s prediction for French state-Islam relations, for example, where she argues that the “unit of incorporation” is the individual citizen, and that “statist” structures prevent “systematic representation or consultation with immigrant groups such that would promote a unified structure” (1994: 87). Indeed, I find that the central question is not, as Soysal suggests, about how Muslim groups adapt to state institutions within the overarching incorporative pressures of postnational rights. She claims that Muslim groups “adopt predominant national organizational models” and that a more centrally organized Islam will emerge in countries where the state actively
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incorporates or defines Islam as a functional group. The more appropriate question is rather how states actively encourage such centralized structures to emerge as a reaction to the challenge of transnational religion.

My argument also contradicts Fetzer and Soper's perspective, in which the institutional opportunity structure alone determines the shape of Muslim accommodation. Governments have recognized that many of their integration challenges with regard to population of Muslim origin requires reigning in certain transnational characteristics of religious communities. It is precisely in reaction to transnational forces that state action is framed. Where regime types matter is in the institutional opportunity structure: whether public recognition entails the creation of a council, a corporation of public law, or a treaty between religious community and state. The importance of national structures and historical state-church settlements does determine which institutional actors will lead the process of nationalization for example, the national interior ministry in France; or courts of law in Germany. And the specific narrative of national accommodation of Islam is of course particular to the historical circumstances of the given country's interaction with the main Muslim sending states; French colonialism left a different legacy than Germany's gastarbeiter program. But I find the similarity in the patterns of institutional outcomes to be striking, given distinctive national approaches to citizenship, divergent state-religion regimes and the political traditions of state-society relations. Of course the outcomes are far from identical, but governments whose doctrines would normally steer them away from religious affairs have all recognized the need to confront the transnational nature of this neglected religious community. By resorting to the use of corporatist-style mechanisms of political integration, governments have shown that the state is alive and well. This chapter must forego the rich detail of the options for public legal status that influence the precise path of Islam's national institutionalization, in favor of identifying the commonalities and drawing attention to the broader themes at play and the mechanisms at work in state-Islam relations.

Charting transnational Muslim organization

These governments' pursuit of state-centric agendas has required managing the competing interests and formal demands of Muslim organizations at home and abroad. It is helpful to view this story in terms of an evolving "supply and demand" for religious leadership for the activity of state-church relations. For reasons related to the nature of civil society in the Arab-Muslim world, Roy argues, European states naturally looked to mosques and prayer rooms – not trade unions or political
parties – as the “spontaneous form of organization” of Muslims in the West (Roy 2002: 19). The mirror image of European governments’ strategy with regard to Islam is the organized Muslim world’s pursuit of its own interests. Since the early 1970s, governments have been faced with a shifting supply of foreign and native-born Muslim religious representatives who operate through embassies or local organizational nodes of transnational movements. The first category of Muslim organizations, broadly speaking, represent the “official Islam” of “sending” states in the Muslim world; these organizations are concerned with protecting spheres of influence among émigré populations and with neutralizing threats to their own sovereignty from the growing Muslim Diaspora. The second category of organizations can be classified as “political Islam”: the dissident movements that sought refuge from repressive regimes and staked out operational bases in Western Europe.

Official Islam – also known as the “Islam of the Embassies” – is characterized by the “sending” states’ foreign policies of ensuring “a cleric in every consulate catchment.” The enduring examples of such organizations are the Muslim World League, the Algerian and Moroccan consular services, and the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs. While Saudi Arabia did not send labor migrants to Europe, its government has sought to expand the kingdom’s religious influence outside the Arab world in part through the Muslim World League (MWL), a Mecca-based NGO founded in 1962. King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz (1964–1975) sought to enable independent Islamic diplomacy through commissioners in Saudi embassies, who would serve as MWL representatives; the MWL Paris bureau chief, for example, simultaneously served as an ambassador to UNESCO. Its charter called for making “direct contact with Muslim minorities and communities wherever they are [. . .] to close ranks and encourage them to speak with a single voice in defense of Muslims and Islam.” The MWL receives dozens of annual funding requests across Europe and has provided major financing for mosques across the continent, from Mantes-la-Jolie, Evry and Lyon to Madrid, Rome, Copenhagen, and Kensington. The boom in Saudi proselytizing around the world – through the construction of grand mosques, the circulation of free Wahhabi prayer books, and the dispatching of missionaries and imams – was funded by petrodollars, at an estimated expense of more than $85 billion between 1975–2005, reflecting a determined effort to establish spiritual and political hegemony over Muslim practice (Hunter 1998: 158 2000).

In addition to this kind of grand strategy, there is also the everyday engagement of embassies and consulates that try to maintain control over émigré populations abroad. Algerian, Moroccan and Turkish consulates,
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for example, keep tabs on associations founded by their nationals abroad; they compile lists of friendly and unfriendly prayer associations, and either offer their support or report potential trouble makers to authorities of the home country or the host government. This Islam of the embassies seeks to retain a guardian status over the religious practice in the Diaspora. The emergence of Turkish, Algerian, and Moroccan federations in Europe that remain loyal to the official Islam of the homeland was no spontaneous event. Rather, consulates and embassies have encouraged – and even helped to administer – organizational structures that bring together the existing prayer associations founded in different European countries under a homeland banner. Here I will briefly discuss the official exportation of Algerian Islam in France and Turkish Islam in Germany.

Shortly after World War I the French president inaugurated the Grande Mosquée de Paris and an association in charge of holy sites (GMP) in French Algeria. Though its first board of directors included Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Senegalese, the GMP gradually came under Algerian domination in the two decades that followed that country’s independence. In 1982, the Algerian government took over responsibility for the GMP’s finances and began using the mosque as a conduit for spreading its official state Islam, creating prayer spaces and attempting to co-opt existing ones following the post-1981 boom in prayer associations. The GMP is organized as a federation with five regional Muftis, and it currently controls 250 prayer spaces and associations around France. The GMP’s rector has authority over 150 imams (just over ten percent of all imams in France), most of whom are imported from Algeria.

Alongside the GMP, one can look to the Turkish directorate for religious affairs (DIB) for a quintessential model of exported “official” Islam. Founded in 1950, this special administration in the prime minister’s office is responsible for the construction, administration and staffing of mosques; its 60,000 clerics-civil servants help organize qur’an courses and publication and censorship of liturgy. The DIB’s mission statement is to “instill love of fatherland, flag and religion,” and a portrait of Atatürk hangs in the front offices and foyers of DIB prayer spaces. Like Algerian state Islam, the DIB lays claim on all Turkish citizens living abroad; it underwrites prayer space and religious education for Turks living abroad through local offices (DITIB), staffing them with diplomats from Turkish consulates. The president of DIB in Turkey is the honorary chairman of every DITIB, and he may participate in DITIB membership and executive meetings (Lemmen 2000). Its prayer spaces in Europe are considered sovereign Turkish territory; when they join the national DITIB umbrella organization, the property is transferred to DIB and comes under the control of the Turkish interior ministry. The organization’s first
German office was founded in 1982 in West Berlin, home to a large Turkish guestworker population. Within two years, the federation had assembled 250 associations under its umbrella. In 1995 Germany's DITIB employed 760 imams, each of whom was hired with statute of public servant and salary from Turkish state for six-year terms. Known as the CCMTF in France, DIB indirectly controls half of all Turkish mosques in Europe.

The two most influential international organizational networks of “political” Islam in Europe – also known as “dissident” Islam – are the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin, MB), of Egyptian inspiration, and the Germany-based Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs (IGMG), of Turkish background. The commonality among these political Islam organizations is their broad ideological outlook regarding the “inseparability of religion and politics” and their recruitment patterns, which attract individuals “far removed from traditional ulamas,” or religious authorities (Roy 2002: 29). The MB consists of a loose ideological network regrouping like-minded leadership figures, whereas IGMG provides formal organizational and financial support to Muslim associations across Europe. The MB was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) in Egypt, the intellectual and political center of Islamism. The movement aimed to Islamize society from below by taking control of religious, academic, cultural and social institutions. In the words of al-Banna: “Islam is faith and religion, country and nationality, religion and state, spirituality and action, book and spade” (Gritti and Allam 2001: 54). The Egyptian branch, in turn, is influential over Moroccan organizations in France (such as the UOIF). The non-governmental organizations based in the Arab-Muslim world – MB (Egypt and Syria), Refa party (Turkey), Jam‘at-I Islami party (Pakistan) – maintain the “international nodes” of transnational forms of Islam (Eickelman 1997: 37). These are not simply political movements, Roy writes, but also a sort of religious brotherhood. These movements were able to spread in western countries through the 1970s and 1980s, Roy argues, thanks to globalized migration and communication technologies (2002).

The Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs (National Vision, IGMG) was originally linked to the Refah party through son of party founder Necmettin Erbakan. Established in Cologne in 1976/1982 as the Islamic Union of Europe (Islamische Union Europa), there are currently fourteen IGMG branches in Europe, including one in Brussels. The Cologne office is responsible for finances, while the Bonn office (established in 1994) oversees religious issues and mosque construction (called the Union of the New World Outlook in Europe, EMUG). Local Milli Görüs branches (called Islamic Federations in Germany) have emerged as a major
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organizational force among Turks in Europe, principally as the arch-
vival of the Turkish state’s directorate for religious affairs (DITIB). The
IGMG defines itself in contrast to the DITIBs which consider themselves
as foreign organizations operating under diplomatic cover, and which the
IGMG view as an obstacle to integration.

The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF) is the
French branch of the FIOE. Headquartered in a defunct factory in the
Parisian suburbs, the federation was founded in 1983 as a rejection of the
Grand Mosque of Paris’s monopoly of representation, and as a result of
other schisms amongst dissidents of “official” Franco-Algerian Islam. It
federates approximately 250 of the many cultural, religious and profes-
sional associations that have appeared since the 1981 reform that allowed
foreigners to found associations. It claims control over 150 prayer spaces,
but directly owns less than a third of these. The UOIF also runs a small
teological seminary. Its current president and general secretary are both
from Morocco, and both came to France to pursue advanced degrees in
Bordeaux. Though the organization has no formal links to the Muslim
Brotherhood, its president has used an MB slogan in interviews (“The
Qur’an is our constitution”) and its general secretary meets regularly with
a roving MB ambassador in Europe. UOIF representatives go on regular
fundraising trips to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, partly with the help
of the French offices of the Muslim World League and private donors.
There are conflicting accounts as to whether it is one-third or two-thirds
foreign-financed, but the organization’s directors speak openly of their
wish to decrease their dependence on foreign aid. The federation main-
tains a “policy of non-intervention” with regard to its donors: the UOIF
independently owns and administers the prayer spaces paid for with Saudi
or Gulf-state money. The UOIF has sought to dispel any ambiguity that
its sympathies lie with its adopted country, however, and in 1990 changed
its name to the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (rather than “in”
France).

Two phases of strategies in Europe

European governments have evolved from a laissez-faire policy of
towards a pro-active policy of “incorporation” (1989–2004), whose goal
is to co-opt the competing representatives of both “official” and “politi-
cal” Islam described in section four above. There were, at first, geo-
political and domestically rooted disincentives to engage Muslim minori-
ties as if they were a permanent segment of national society. But this
period was followed by new and powerful incentives to end a policy of
laissez-faire. Just like the German government came to view the Turkish population in Germany as worthy of “einbürgerung” (naturalization) by the late 1990s, Muslim religious representatives went from being treated as exogenous actors to serving as local government interlocutors. This shift from outsourcing to incorporation led to a change in the demand for representative organizations in the practical and politically symbolic realm of state-church relations. State-Islam relations emerged as the primary category of integration policy, replacing the emphasis on nationality or citizenship (Favell 1998; Bleich 2003). This has led to sustained efforts to institutionalize relations between religion offices and Muslim organizations along the lines of existing arrangements for other religions.

It was not long after the end of mass migration in 1973–1974 that national and local governments in Europe realized they would require an interlocutor in order to attend to the basic religious needs of their newly settled foreign populations: for example, prayer space, imams, and facilities for ritual lamb slaughter and travel visas for pilgrimage to Mecca. But host societies’ ambivalent attitudes towards the permanence of these new populations manifested themselves in the type of interlocutor that governments sought out. Official “return migration” incentives were in place into the early 1980s (Cesari 1994; Koopmans 1999), and a template of temporary migration defined the governments’ demand during the first phase. Guestworkers and their offspring were not destined for citizenship; and Islam, as the religion of foreigners, was “an exogenous reality,” as De Galemberg writes (2001). Governments thus largely entrusted embassies and representatives of the “official Islams” of the Muslim world, whether sending states (e.g., Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey) or centers of religious authority (e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia). Faced with a community of modest means, and given the legal and political difficulties of providing public funding, European governments encouraged the use of foreign funds for religious practice. From an electoral perspective, local officials undoubtedly viewed this as a safer route in the short term, at a time when extreme right parties were finding their bearings in response to the increasingly visible presence of immigrants in big cities by the late 1970s and early 1980s. This encouragement of a “home country” identity in the domain of religion dovetailed with a mutual fiction of an eventual “return home” for migrants and even their locally-born children.

European governments tolerated the Islamic proselytism of foreign envoys from DITIB, MWL and the GMP, for example, for a clear set of pragmatic reasons. The large, classical mosques that were planned and built across Europe during this period were justified as a fix for the practical needs of local Muslims. It made sense to rely on homeland governments for material requirements of religious observance since
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those states had experience in its practical administration. Additionally, those homeland governments attended to the housekeeping of combating extremism in their own national interest. The implantation of official Islam in European national landscapes thus offered a security guarantee. As one French interior ministry official recalled, “Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, and Senegal were able to offer France a common front that was perhaps not pro-Western but at least anti-terrorist” (confidential interview, June 2002).


The minimal accommodation of Islam that took place in the first period should be seen in this context. With the minor exception of prayer spaces created in some workplaces and public housing units, governments outsourced relations to Muslim representatives to the embassies and consulates of sending states and the regional religious powerhouse, Saudi Arabia. When the local government in Bavaria created Turkish language religious instruction in public schools in the early 1980s, for example, Turkish consular officials from DITIB were responsible for curriculum and instruction; in the absence of religious education for Muslims in public schools in North-Rhine Westphalia, the Saudis created the King Fahd Akademie. French authorities allotted funds for Arabic language radio programs through the Fonds d’Action Sociale, and the foreign ministry created theological scholarships for foreign imams through a program known as Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d’Origine (ELCO). A rare European Community directive concerning migrant populations in 1976 allowed for mother-tongue classes to be sponsored by “sending” countries, taught by foreigners for third-country nationals in the European Community. What might ostensibly look like multicultural programs, however, were in fact the opposite: the relation with state Islam and homeland culture was intended to facilitate that eventual re-insertion at home.

This policy of laissez-faire also served as a diplomatic nod to regional powers in the Muslim world, where a reshuffling of the power balance had taken place in the aftermath of Egypt’s 1973 defeat against Israel, and, in 1979, the Iranian revolution and the religiously-inspired coup attempt in Saudi Arabia (Rudolph 1997; Eickelman 1997). European countries sought to contain the regional aspirations of newly theocratic and Shi’ite Iran by supporting its Arab Sunni rivals in Saudi Arabia and the Maghreb. French President Giscard even sent troops to help alleviate the House of Saud’s difficulties with armed militants in Mecca. Tokens of good faith were offered by European governments eager to
be on good terms with regional powers in the Arab world, who were the source not only of immigration but also of oil. In the aftermath of OPEC’s (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil embargo of the United States and the Netherlands in 1973–1974, the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was institutionalized between twenty-one Arab states and the ten countries of the European Community. The EAD met several times a year to discuss trade issues alongside the theme of “cultural cooperation” (Benchenane 1983). Grandiose diplomatic gestures and monuments to the Islamic presence in Europe soon followed, such as the enormous Rome mosque at Monte Antenne (authorized by the local city council in 1974 in cooperation with Prime Minister Andreotti, who had personally asked for the Pope’s blessing of a minaret in the heart of western Christendom); the Belgian recognition of Islam as a national religion in 1974; and the MWL’s creation of major Islamic centers in Brussels and Vienna in 1975. The funds for mosque construction, decorations, and personnel salaries were provided by Saudi, Moroccan, Algerian and Turkish embassies and donors from the Gulf States – who were either solicited by non-state Islam groups or the collaboration of state Islam with wealthy backers.

_Incorporation (1989–2004)_

Nineteen eighty-nine marked a watershed year that initiated a second phase of state-Islam relations, after which governments sought to reassert state sovereignty over transnational Muslim networks. There were several confrontational events involving Islam in the international arena that year. First, the Ayatollah pronounced an unfavorable fatwa against Salman Rushdie for his allegedly blasphemous novel _The Satanic Verses_. Then three headscarf-wearing girls were expelled from a junior high school outside Paris. Finally, that same year, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan (Kepel 1991; Parekh 2000). The post-communist void in central Asia would soon reveal to Europe the extent of Saudi (and later, Turkish) institutional and financial deployment and proselytizing outside of the Arab world. These events pointed all eyes towards the European territory itself. These events reverberated within Muslim communities across the continent, and opened local governments’ eyes to the reality of transnational memberships among the minority populations. Soon thereafter, the Allied war to drive Iraq out of Kuwait provided further ripples across Muslim populations – where there were a few expressions of sympathy for President Hussein and lack of understanding for the Saudi alliance with the United States-led coalition – and several incidents of Algerian _jihadi_ terrorism in France in the mid-1990s culminated with a
deadly shootout between French special forces and a young Frenchman of Algerian origin.

Cumulative integration failures among young Muslim Europeans contributed to the crystallizing sentiment that, as Heclo describes the moment preceding policy shifts, “spread a general conviction that something must be done” (Heclo 1974, 306). By the mid-late 1980s, the children and grandchildren of labor migrants had grown up, and the largely civic-based integration strategy had failed to achieve results in the second and third generations. The half-hearted strategies of inclusion that had stressed anti-racism or citizenship and electoral participation had, to a large extent, fallen flat: schools in the large urban centers that are home to populations of immigrant origin suffered from budgetary crises; military service was no longer obligatory; and voting rights had not led to much parliamentary representation. The shortcomings of the promise of integration and socioeconomic mobility were clear for all to see. Most significantly for the purposes of this chapter, however, by the late 1980s the convenient bargain of outsourcing was ultimately judged to be counterproductive in terms of the integration of Muslims. NGOs associated with the political Islam movements of transnational Muslim civil society in the Diaspora – such as the UOIF and IGMG discussed above – were increasingly assertive and behaved similarly to the peak associations of official Islam. They conglomerated sympathetic prayer rooms and cultural associations under common-law umbrella organizations that were ineligible for the status of state-church associations, and therefore beyond the oversight and control of the government.

In this same period, the second and third generations who had been expected to assimilate (or to return “home”) instead discovered religious identity in their new societies. Surveys have shown that many of these young people identified more with their inherited religion than with their nationality, place of residence or even gender – what might be called re-Islamization or the “Ummah phenomenon” (Ummah refers to the larger Muslim community) (Bouzar 2004; Geisser and Finan 2002). Jean-Pierre Chevénement, who as interior minister initiated the final round of consultations leading to the French Council for the Muslim Religion, pointed to this development in an interview: “It was only upon discovering that Islam was a form of identity affirmation for people who do not have much else that I [realized] it was important to engage in dialogue with these young people, who are having an identity crisis – we must not leave Islam outside” (personal interview, November 2003). This observation is emblematic of a broader change among public authorities, who adjusted their view of second and third generations from “youth of immigrant
origin,” and came to see them, for limited public policy purposes, as “Muslims.”

Authorities’ attitudes towards “official” Islam changed significantly during this period. It is not that European governments suddenly discovered the Islam of “sending” states to be anti-democratic or even fundamentalist; indeed as “official” Isams they aim by definition for a peaceful relationship between religion and state. But their religious emis- saries perpetuated a competing foreign tie among populations of immi- grant origin – an Islam “in” rather than “of,” in politicians’ shorthand. Combined with a growing perception of transnational threats linked to global Islam, the maturation of migrant Muslim communities that retained strong organizational ties to homeland governments and nurtured connections with almost entirely unregulated dissident organizations of “political” Islam (Eickelman 1997: 31).

In this second phase of state-Islam relations, Interior Ministries initiated consultations with a broader swathe of Muslim representatives, expanding their contacts with Muslims well beyond the “official” Isams of the homeland. This required delicate negotiations in which officials felt a need to tread lightly, and included not just diplomatic representa- tives (though they remained crucial) but also civil society organizations – including international NGOs affiliated with political or dissident Islam. This period has seen the reassertion of nation state sovereignty over the informal influence of international religious NGOs and foreign embassies. This phase of Muslim incorporation has been about “de-transnationalization,” or undoing the power arrangement of the 1970s and 1980s that had privileged Saudi Arabia and other Muslim “sending” states in the practice of Islam in Europe – in addition to reigning in the unregulated associations of transnational “political” Islam active on national territory. Interior ministries provided the first impetus to organize Islam as a “national” religion, and the government-led consultat- ions established a variety of national councils. In 1989, France began its fifteen-year journey to the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman; by 1992, Spain had a Comision Islamica; by 1998 Belgium had an Exécutif Musulman; by 2000, there were special councils to guide state-Islam relations in seven German Länder; by 2002, official encouragement led to a newly consolidated Muslim Council of Britain; and by 2003, an Italian Consultation was initiated to create an interlocutor among the newly arrived Muslim communities there.

These national processes are not identical, naturally: some place more weight on the role of “official” Islam and foreign government representa- tives (Belgium is seen as one case of this), while others rely more heavily on handpicked local civil society organizations (Italy is a good example).
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There are some striking differences: the French administration has been content to concentrate solely on religious representation: the CFCM is designed only to represent the six percent – eight percent of observant Muslims who regularly attend prayer services (Laurence 2005). Italy has proposed something less official than a council: an informal consultation, or Consulta, which aspires not only to religious representation, but also social and political representation of the Muslim minority. Italian officials are aiming the creation of their Consulta at what Interior Minister Pisanu calls the ninety-five percent of moderate Muslims, whether observant or not: civil society representatives, secular Muslims, women’s groups, etc. In Germany, by contrast, the councils in various Länder (since religion is a local competence) have resembled single-issue coalitions around specific tasks, such as organizing religious education in public schools. German accommodation of Islam has also heavily relied on court cases and a special role has been held by the office of for the protection of the constitution, which has had the practical effect of excluding “political” Islam participants from consultations.

But the commonalities of these national consultations with Islam in the second period are nonetheless very striking. European nation-states have undertaken a gradual institutional process of “de-transnationalizing” the practice of Islam. These governments have gone about integrating Islam into state-church relations by negotiating a delicate settlement between “official” and “political” Islam, and they have used several specific instruments of nationalization familiar from previous instances of institutional incorporation. Space constraints prevent a full discussion of these instruments, but they include three crucial steps: a charter or founding document in which participating Muslim organizations confirm their respect for the rule of law; the establishment of technical working groups that include representatives of official and political Islams alongside state representatives; and, crucially, the nomination or election of a representative council that can serve as an interlocutor for state-church affairs.

Conclusion

The emergence of organized Islam as a permanent fixture in the European religious landscape was underway long before September 11th, before a surge in anti-Semitic acts, or the departure of young British and French Muslims on suicide missions in Israel and Iraq. Contrary to the announcement of the state’s imminent death in the face of globalization and transnationalism, we can see that government activity is alive and well. European nation-states have established routines of contacts
with Muslim leaders, leading to a new level of mutual acquaintance and a slow but steady process of nationalization of religious authority.

Church-state relations are of vital importance because these institutional links with religious communities provide key elements of political integration. If unattended to, as it was in the first period of “outsourcing,” transnational religious networks have the potential to threaten the state and its maintenance of social order. By taking the initiative to incorporate and nationalize Islam in their respective institutional orders, European states have attempted to influence what kind of Islam young people discover – whether they search out religion as a reaction against European societies, or whether they are just satisfying curiosity about their heritage, or carrying on family traditions. Church-state relations are instrumental to achieving the state’s core duties of stability and security. Governments took into consideration the unintended consequences of their previous laissez-faire strategies in state-Islam relations and took stock of unanticipated developments among the immigrant populations. Of course, these populations did not “go home” and the networks of embassies and NGOs whose religious activities and proselytism European governments had uncritically tolerated for fifteen years turned out to be more tenacious than expected. But the strategy in the first period of keeping religion private, of keeping Islam out of the public sphere, and of using international diplomacy to manage the religion of immigrants was judged to be a failure. The national governments have assumed an active posture in state-religion affairs because Islam has emerged as a major factor of individual and group identity among the descendants of labor migrants.

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